top of page
Search

Hacking Healthcare: Why Hospitals Are the New Favorite Target


Hacking Healthcare
Hacking Healthcare: Why Hospitals Are the New Favorite Target

Hospitals and healthcare providers are increasingly attractive targets for cyber-attackers because they combine high-value data, mission-critical operations, legacy technology, and intense pressure to restore service quickly. Beyond data theft, attacks can put lives at risk, delay care, and cost millions. This makes the hospital sector uniquely vulnerable—and the criminals know it.


Why healthcare? The attacker’s POV

From the perspective of an attacker, the healthcare sector delivers a powerful value proposition:

  • Extremely valuable data: Patient records hold protected health information (PHI), which includes identity, medical history, treatments, insurance data, financial info. This is both high-value for identity theft and data resale.

  • Mission-critical operations: Hospitals must remain operational 24/7. When systems are unavailable, patient care gets delayed or diverted. That increases stress and urgency—profile ideal for ransomware or extortion.

  • Complex, fragmented environment: Modern hospitals include older (sometimes unsupported) IT systems, medical devices (IoMT), remote contractors, third-party vendors, cloud services, applications for billing, imaging, labs—all creating many access points.

  • Weak security posture + budget constraints: Many providers prioritize patient care and clinical investment over IT/infosec, especially smaller clinics and rural hospitals. Attackers exploit that.

  • Urgency to restore services = negotiation leverage: Because patient lives hang in the balance, hospitals may feel forced to pay ransom quickly or accept workarounds, making them lucrative targets.


Real-world examples that show the stakes

Healthcare leads incident reports

In a recent study, 65% of the 100 largest U.S. hospitals and health systems had recent data breaches. Cybernews+2GlobeNewswire+2Specifically:

  • In 2024, healthcare data breaches compromised ~276.8 million records—a 64.1% increase year-over-year. Cybernews+1

  • 79% of the top 100 hospitals scored D or worse for cybersecurity posture in one index. 30% had critical vulnerabilities. Cybernews+1


Patient care disruption & mortality risk

A survey found:

  • 92% of healthcare organizations experienced at least one cyber-attack in the past 12 months. Healthcare Dive+1

  • Nearly 70% reported that the attacks disrupted patient care. Healthcare Dive

  • Among those, 56% said they saw more procedure complications and 28% said mortality rates rose. Healthcare DiveAnother source reports: 72% of healthcare organizations experienced patient care disruptions due to cyber attacks in 2025. HC Innovation GroupAcademic research found that data breaches correlate with increased 30-day mortality rates for heart attack patients. arXiv


Cost and scale

  • The average cost of a data breach in healthcare rose to ~$9.8 million in 2024. ScienceSoft+1

  • In 2024, healthcare organizations reported that ~67% had suffered ransomware attacks (data-encryption event) in that year. ScienceSoft+1

  • Global data: In 2022, healthcare recorded the highest increase of cyberattacks among any industry—74% year-over-year increase. The HIPAA Journal


Supply-chain & vendor impact

A major example: Change Healthcare (a major medical-billing/processing vendor) was hit in Feb 2024, affecting pharmacies, hospitals, labs across the U.S. The ripple-effect shows how an attack on a vendor becomes a hospital-system problem. American Hospital Association+1


Why hospitals are easier (and more rewarding) to hit — deeper technical & organizational causes


Legacy systems & unmanaged assets

Hospitals often have a mix of old and new systems: decades-old EHRs (electronic health records), imaging systems, custom-built devices, and medical devices that were not designed with security in mind. For example, nearly three in four infusion pumps had at least one exploitable vulnerability. MGMAResearch shows many hospital websites still use plain HTTP (no HTTPS) or lack DNSSEC, indicating poor foundational web security. arXiv


Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) and device risk

Medical devices—including patient monitors, infusion pumps, imaging machines—are increasingly networked (IoMT). Many have embedded OS, limited or no automatic patching, are part of clinical workflows (you can’t just reboot them anytime). These factors make patching difficult and increase exposure.


Vendor & third-party ecosystem complexity

Consider the ecosystem: hospitals rely on labs, imaging centers, pharmacy networks, billing/payment processors, insurance systems, cloud services. Attackers often exploit a vendor (third-party) as the weak link and then pivot into the hospital system—supply-chain attacks. This amplifies risk and breadth of impact.


Human factors & social engineering

Clinicians and hospital staff are under high stress, heavy workloads, and may be less security-conscious (or have less time/training). Phishing remains one of the dominant intrusion vectors in healthcare. According to one source, in 2024 phishing was the most common access vector for healthcare breaches. Cobalt


The business model: mission urgency and ransom leverage

Because hospitals cannot afford downtime (patients, procedures, lives at risk), attackers exploit the fact that the victim has high incentive to restore service quickly, even if it means paying ransom or accepting risk. The urgency gives adversaries leverage. The “blast radius” of an outage extends beyond the hospital to community-care impact. American Hospital Association


Under-resourced security governance

Many healthcare providers are under-funded in IT security when compared with other industries. Especially smaller hospitals or clinics may lack dedicated security teams, mature processes, or budget for continuous monitoring and forensic readiness. One survey found only 53% of providers consider their systems ready to defend against cyber risks. I.S. Partners


Patient safety implications — it’s not just data

It’s easy to think of cyberattacks as “just data theft” but in healthcare the stakes are far higher:

  • Delayed care: Systems down = paper fallback, manual processes, diverted ambulances, delayed surgeries, canceled appointments.

  • Clinical errors: With IT systems offline, record access, diagnostic tools, imaging workflows may be impaired, increasing risk of medication errors or diagnostic delays.

  • Lives at risk: The earlier mortality data suggests even small increases in mortality rates after breaches. arXiv+1

  • Trust & reputation: Patients expect their health providers to safeguard privacy and continuity of care. Breaches/shutdowns erode trust, which may drive patients away or discourage care-seeking.

  • Financial survival: Hospitals lose revenue when systems are offline, claims can’t be processed, or patients are diverted. For smaller hospitals, that may threaten viability.

For example: a June 2024 attack in London caused nearly 1,600 operations and appointments to be canceled in one week due to pathology IT system compromise. The Guardian


What hospitals should do now — prioritized, practical steps

Here’s a detailed action roadmap that hospital leadership and cybersecurity teams should follow. This isn’t just IT talk — it’s clinical-safety, risk-management, and operational continuity.


1. Embed cybersecurity into clinical-safety governance

  • The board and executive leadership must treat cybersecurity as a clinical safety issue, not purely an IT matter.

  • Include cyber metrics in the hospital risk-register, and link it to patient-safety programs.

  • Run table-top and live-drill exercises simulating system outages, ransomware events, medical-device failures, and vendor supply-chain compromise.

  • Create clear roles: who is the incident commander, who leads forensic response, who communicates with regulators/patients.


2. Harden the basics (low hanging fruit)

  • Patch management: Develop a prioritized inventory of systems, especially mission-critical ones (EHR, lab systems, imaging, devices). Ensure timely patches for known vulnerabilities.

  • Multi-factor authentication (MFA): Deploy across all admin accounts, remote access, vendor/provider access. Attackers often exploit weak credentials.

  • Network segmentation: Separate networks for clinical devices (IoMT), guest WiFi, administrative corporate systems, EHR systems. This limits lateral movement.

  • Backups and offline/air-gapped recovery: Neutralize ransomware by having reliable backups that cannot be encrypted by attackers. Regularly test restore capability.

  • Email security / phishing training: Regular phishing simulations for staff; educate clinicians/nurses about suspicious links, credential reuse, social engineering.

  • Credential/identity hygiene: Audit accounts, disable inactive accounts, enforce least-privilege access.


3. Secure the third-party ecosystem

  • Maintain an up-to-date inventory of vendors, suppliers, labs, pharmacy networks, imaging centers, cloud providers.

  • Require vendor assets that interact with hospital systems to meet baseline security standards (MFA, logging, incident response capabilities).

  • Use contractual terms: right to audit, breach notification requirements, access controls, privileged-access monitoring.

  • Use monitoring / logging of third-party access to hospital systems; set up alerts for unusual vendor behavior (off-hours logins, large data transfers).


4. Medical-device (IoMT) security strategy

  • Create and maintain an inventory of all connected medical devices: manufacturer, model, OS/firmware version, patch history, network connectivity.

  • Work with device vendors for firmware updates and vulnerability remediation; prioritize devices with known vulnerabilities.

  • Establish compensating controls where patching is infeasible: network isolation of device subnet, restrictive firewall rules, dedicated device VLANs, logging of device traffic.

  • Conduct penetration test/ vulnerability assessments specifically for IoMT devices.


5. Incident preparedness and recovery

  • Develop and test incident-response plans specific to cyber-events (ransomware, data exfiltration, vendor outage). Clarify roles (clinical, IT, communications, legal).

  • Ensure that clinical continuity plans exist: what happens if EHR is offline? Manual fallback? Paper records? Who makes decisions to divert patients?

  • Pre-arrange relationships with forensic/IR firms, cyber‐insurers, legal counsel, PR teams. Time matters.

  • Practice drills for full outage scenarios: EHR offline, lab systems down, imaging unavailable. Measure time to resume critical workflows.

  • Establish communication templates: to staff, to patients, to regulators. Transparency matters.


6. Transparency & patient communication

  • Develop protocols for notifying patients when PHI is compromised or when care is disrupted.

  • Maintain trust by timely, clear, and empathetic communication.

  • Educate patients about what they can do (monitor bills/records, watch for identity theft).


7. Investing in resilience, not just prevention

  • Recognize you cannot stop all attacks. Focus on resilience: minimum downtime, safe fallback processes, quick recovery.

  • Monitor and measure: Mean Time to Detect (MTTD), Mean Time to Respond (MTTR), percentage of systems with patches older than 90 days, number of accounts without MFA.

  • Align cyber investments with clinical-risk outcomes: e.g., how does downtime of X hours translate into patient harm and financial cost? Use that to justify investment.


What patients can do to protect themselves

While hospitals bear large responsibility, patients also have a role. Here are practical tips:

  • Monitor your records and bills. Review your explanation of benefits (EOBs), check for unfamiliar treatments or providers.

  • Use strong, unique passwords for your patient-portal accounts and enable MFA if offered.

  • Ask providers about their cyber posture. During intake or visits, you might ask: “What security measures do you have to protect my data and ensure continuity of care if systems go down?”

  • Freeze your credit if you suspect ID theft. If your health insurer or provider was breached, you may be at risk for identity fraud via your medical/insurance data.

  • Be vigilant with email/phishing attempts. If you receive emails that appear from your provider or insurer asking for credentials or unsolicited links, treat with caution.

  • Make backups of your own health records. Save/download your medical records periodically (lab results, imaging, summaries) so you have offline copies if your provider has an outage.


Policy & industry levers that matter

Beyond individual hospitals and patients, the broader regulatory and policy environment plays a critical role:

  • Regulatory enforcement & reporting: The industry is seeing stricter enforcement of data- breach reporting (e.g., under Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) in the U.S.), and potential new rules for healthcare cybersecurity. The Wall Street Journal+1

  • Information sharing & threat intelligence: Sector-specific ISACs (e.g., Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center (Health-ISAC)), joint advisories from agencies such as Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) / Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), help healthcare orgs become aware of emerging threats quickly.

  • Funding & incentives: Subsidies, grants, or insurance / reimbursement incentives tied to minimum cybersecurity standards can help especially smaller or rural hospitals.

  • Vendor accountability: As supply-chain attacks rise, regulations or industry standards that hold vendors accountable (secure-by-design medical devices, mandatory patching, transparent vulnerability disclosures) become important.

  • Workforce development: More trained cyber professionals in healthcare are needed—both in IT security and clinical-IT convergence roles.

  • Standardization of resilience metrics: Defining baseline metrics for healthcare cyber-resilience (e.g., maximum downtime without patient-safety impact) helps benchmarking and regulation.


Final takeaways

  • The healthcare sector remains a top target because it brings together high-value data, critical operations, and weaker defensive postures.

  • Attacks on hospitals are not just about data loss—they can disrupt care, delay diagnosis/treatment, increase complications and mortality, and erode trust.

  • A practical defense strategy blends prevention and resilience: patching, segmentation, vendor oversight, incident readiness, but also fallback workflows and recovery planning.

  • Patients play a role — by safeguarding their credentials, monitoring their records, and being proactive about their providers’ security.

  • The ecosystem and policy environment matter: supply-chain, regulation, intelligence sharing, vendor accountability, and cyber workforce all contribute to strengthening healthcare security.


Need Help Getting Secured? Contact Cybrvault Today!

Protect your business, your home, and your digital life with Cybrvault Cybersecurity, your trusted experts in:

• Security audits

• Business network protection

• Home cybersecurity

• Remote work security

• Incident response and forensics

🔒 Don’t wait for a breach, secure your life today!

Visit www.cybrvault.com to schedule your free consultation!


Hacking Healthcare

Hacking Healthcare

 
 
 
bottom of page